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Tracking the next pandemic: Avian Flu Talk

Dead Crows & Potential Avian Flu

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mommabear View Drop Down
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote mommabear Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 28 2006 at 1:25pm
Hi Northern Momma. Yes nice avitar to you also! I hope you are correct. Like I said I try to stay up to date on bird flu and I had never heard this. Did you happen to go to the site? This was the first time I saw the site also so I wanted the opinion of others who like myself try to stay informed.  Thanks for the reply also!
Learn from the past,look toward the future.
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote northern_mamma Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 28 2006 at 1:51pm
Hi mommabear. Yes, I went to both sites--if I understand what you mean. I'm not familiar with the fluplan.com site, but I felt it was irrresponsible in making that  "10% statement". And I visited both links there (had read the Mercury News piece earlier, as well as the Rumsfeld thing.)

As to whether or not birds in North America are already infected...I'm not a betting woman--well okay, actually I am--and I'd bet that yes, they are.  Birds, as well as other animals. I'm not an alarmist by nature, but I can't imagine how any reasonable person who's keeping up on this can draw any other conclusion. Frankly, I'm worried as hell.

But I just wanted to set the record straight on that 10% statement. That ticked me off.

NM
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I have seen the article that you were talking about, Mammabear.  BF was found in feces in Northern Alaska last year but I don't believe that it was H5N1..the deadly strain.    I beleive that is was on a website for Alaska or the migration of Alaskan bird or something.  I'll try to find it.
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Kathy L. Dean ,
 
Presence of live avian flu chain worrying: scientists
"BHOPAL: India may seem to have contained the spread of the bird flu, but scientists testing for the H5N1 virus say the presence of a live chain of the disease is worrying.

Researchers at the High Security Animal Disease Laboratory here say that many of the samples are unfit for testing as proper procedures were not followed for their collection and preservation.

"Most bird flu samples reaching us remain unfit for testing," H.K. Pradhan, head laboratory, told IANS. Several thousand samples, packed in iceboxes, arrive in the lab from various places.

"Many of the samples come in such a poor condition that it is not possible for the virus to be alive," he lamented.

The four samples that tested positive last week, he said, were from scattered domesticated population. "Though the samples showed the presence of the H5 virus, their N1 status could not been tested.

"But it is quite certain that they would have tested positive for N1 as well which means the virus is still in the environment and a direct link exists, as H5N1 cannot transmit without a live carrier," Pradhan said"
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote JamesUSA Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 29 2006 at 3:57pm

Dead crows in Nepal:

Excerpt from a Nepalese newspaper:

Nepaleyes headlines: Hundreds of birds die in Kapilvastu
http://www.nepaleyes.com/read.php?topic=headlines&id=1796
Wednesday, March 29, 2006 3:49:00 PM GMT-8

Hundreds of birds die in Kapilvastu
Nepaleyes Report
Butwal, March 29
Hundreds of wild birds including crows and doves have died at a village of Kapilvastu district in western Nepal over the past few days. Locals fear it could be a bird flu epidemic.
"Birds were found dead at jungle and farmed areas over the past three days," said Nityananda Poudel, a local resident. "Jackals and dogs are feeding on them, which is making us more anxious."  

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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote kathylynndean Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 29 2006 at 11:13pm
Oh my goodness, I am so sorry I have not posted lately.   I am trying to catch up on everything I didn't do around here last week!
 
I took the crows to the Oregon Dept of Fish and Wildlife office on Monday.   I gave them to Mark A. Vargas, 541 826-8774 x228.   He is tha District Wildlife Biologist for the Rogue Watershed, and his e-mail is Mark.A.Vargas@ state.or.us
 
He told me that he would drive the crows, plus all the fecal samples, plus my pond water sample, to Salem the following day.   He had to attend a meeting, and would give the birds to someone he knew that lived in Corvallis.
 
Well, on Tuesday afternoon (03-28-06) I phoned Dr. Jerry Heidel, 541 737-6964, to make sure he had received the birds.   He is the head of the labratory at the University.   He said no, he hadn't, and was just wondering where they were.
 
So I phoned the ODFW and got Steve, who told me to not worry about my crows (Yeah, sure...He must have detected the panic in my voice) and he was just getting ready to phone Vargas, and he would get back to me.
 
Steve phoned back about 10 minutes later to tell me that Mark had given the crows to "Nancy Taylor" and she would take them to the Corvallis lab.  I asked who she was; Steve had no idea, but again told me not to worry.   Steve mentioned that the birds would probably not get to the lab until the following day, which is today.
 
I phoned Dr. Heidel back and told him the news; he had no idea who Nancy Taylor was; had never heard of her.   I of course had this horrible sinking feeling in my stomach.   I had not saved one of the crows as suggested, and had turned over all three to the ODFW.
 
Every time I tried to phone the lab today, the line was busy.   Very strange.   I believe the "Invitation Only" H5N1 meeting in Portland is tomorrow, but I will try to get ahold of someone in the lab.   I am assuming that probably everyone that does lab work at the university will be at that meeting.
 
So yes, I am concerned.   I told Dr. Heidel to please keep in touch with me so I know what is going on.   In fact, I will e-mail him tonight, plus leave a message on his answering machine to make sure the crows are in the lab.   I will let you all know tomorrow.
 
If they test positive, I have a feeling I will hear about it on the news, and not in person.   I just don't think they will trust a "lowly citizen" with that type of info.   I could be wrong.   For health reasons alone, I had better find out ASAP!
 
I get more upset daily when I read the news articles on H5N1.   I have never mentioned this, but my little 6 acre ranch is named "Rancho del Pajaro."    Pajaro in Spanish means bird.   I adore birds, and the thought of 80% of the species contacting H5N1 brings tears to my eyes.   I can not even stand the thought.
 
I was raking the remaining leaves from my property today, because when H5N1 "officially" hits us, I do not want any leaf cover on the ground.   It's legal to burn in Oregon this time of year, so when I get a huge pile, I set it on fire, making sure there are no overhanging limbs!
 
As I was standing there watching the fire, I noticed there were no birds chirping.   There are normally always bird sounds coming from somewhere, especially in the spring.   Plus the Gray tree squirrels are mating now, so they are normally yapping away.   Absolute silence; not one sound.   I started to cry because I can not even imagine a world without birds.   They mean so much to me.   I realize I should be more worried about people, especially since Oregon just made the announcement that 1/3 of the State's people could die because the hospitals are not prepared!   Something is drastically the matter with this damn place, said Kathy, a third generation Native San Franciscan!!!
 
I am going to be posting quite a few things tonight; hope it's okay!
Kathy 
 
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ALASKA CHECKING ALL MIGRATORY BIRDS ETC:
 
This news article seems to suggest that Alaska plans to check ponds and rivers carefully for any kind of virus from bird droppings and so on....many kinds of birds. If Oregon gets it via migration over Alaska, the Alaskan efforts should help those in Oregon with foreknowledge.
 
JamesUSA
 
-------------------
 
Alaska to Run Bird Flu Tests in Lakes and Ponds

By Yereth Rosen

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (Reuters) - Biologists in Alaska plan to test water samples from lakes and ponds in the habitats of migratory birds to check for traces of the deadly avian flu virus, state officials said on Wednesday.

Alaska is considered North America's most likely point of entry for the H5N1 strain of bird flu, because it stands at a crossroads of wild waterfowl and shorebird migration to and from Asia.

State officials plan to monitor the natural habitat of migratory birds for contamination from infected birds' droppings in addition to taking swabs from nearly 15,000 wild birds spread over more than two dozen species.

"If we have birds bringing this in from Asia sit down on a water body, other species of birds that don't interact directly with Asia may also use that water body and pick up a virus," Matt Robus, director at Alaska's Division of Wildlife Conservation, told reporters.

Mallards and pintails in the water could become infected and then carry the virus south, officials said.

Although avian-to-human transmission is rare, people can contract bird flu after coming into contact with infected birds. The World Health Organization says 105 people are known to have died so far from the H5N1 strain.

"If people avoid groups of sick and dead birds and only deal with healthy-appearing live ones there ought to be no exposure or very minimal risk," said Robus.

Alaska's test results will be monitored carefully to see if the H5N1 virus, like other influenza viruses, mutates to become more contagious, said Richard Mandsager, director of Alaska's Division of Public Health.

State and federal wildlife agencies have established a toll-free number for citizens to report bird die-offs or suspiciously sick birds, officials said.

There is also a bill pending in the legislature to increase the state's authority to quarantine sick domesticated animals, including backyard poultry and pet birds that might be vulnerable to the strain of avian flu.

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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote kathylynndean Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 12:29am
Some of my favorite Oregon quotes.   Below each quote is the link to the article.

That prediction does not necessarily mean people, the poultry industry, pets or the economy would be afflicted. To this point, the disease has not spread directly from birds to humans -- only from people handling diseased live or uncooked poultry.   (Huh?)Confused

Whether the Bush administration's preparations for a pandemic that may never come amount to prudent planning or an overreaction has been a subject of debate among government spending experts. (Idiots!) Pinch

But it’s too early for action, an Oregon State University Extension Service poultry science specialist said. 
“Right now I would do nothing,” said Jim Hermes, who works with the state’s commercial poultry industry and with backyard growers. (And that seems to be exactly what OR is doing!) Exclamation

"In regards to avian flu, the commercial poultry industry in Oregon is pretty biosecure," Baker said. "The biggest threat to this disease spreading from wild birds such as ducks is from the small outdoor, or backyard flocks."  (Sure)   http://www.oregonlive.com/news/argus/index.ssf?/base/news/114298037263730.xml&coll=6

Scientists say April through September of this year may be a crucial time frame in terms of knowing whether the disease will spread to the United States via migratory birds.  (Get your heads out of the sand, or elsewhere) Dead

U.S. wildlife experts have been monitoring wild migratory birds since the virus emerged in Asia in 1997.  (Time for a vaccine?) Nuke
"How much testing is done in California will depend on what is found in Alaska," said Al Donner, a spokesman for U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  (Give me strength.) Cry

The H5N1 virus was first discovered in China in 1996. Spread by migratory birds, it is now in eastern Europe and northern Africa, as well as Asia.

If birds from the West Coast become infected, waterfowl hunters potentially would be among the first humans in North America to encounter those birds and be exposed to H5N1.

Remember, the sky is not falling. It's just full of bugs that you might want to know about. (This reporter should be shot.   What is it?   1996 or 1997.) Ouch

The real impact of avian influenza is suppressed demand of leg quarters, and that’s helping depress all chicken prices,” he said.
 
When looking at current conditions in this country – the absence of highly pathogenic avian flu strains and tight biosecurity measures in large-scale domestic flocks – Mattos said that “a lot has to happen for it (avian flu) to turn into a pandemic.”

“We need to educate people about that,”
he said. (This is all a joke, right?   All they are worried about is the lowering of prices on chicken leg quarters!) Censored

Manoj Pastey, an assistant professor in biomedical science at the Oregon State University College of Veterinary Medicine, has received a $100,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to develop tests that would let poultry growers know within minutes whether their chickens harbor either the H5 or H7 types of avian influenza.
 
Pastey predicts a laboratory-scale test will be available within 18 months. Commercial development, he said, would take much longer  (Uh, you can buy them on the Internet already.) Pig

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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote kathylynndean Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 12:50am
I promised to post the Species of birds listed in the US Government H5N1 Document.   I will break it into about four sections, with WATERFOWL being the first species listed.   You will have to scroll right to see all tables:
 

Table 4-2. Waterfowl species as potential carriers of the Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza subtype to North America.

 

Asian Contact

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Specifics1

Point of Contact

Tundra Swan

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Portion of breeding range in Chukotka.  From there birds migrate to staging and wintering areas throughout Pacific Flyway.

Chukotka

Whooper Swan

Yes

Yes

Nov - Apr

Eastern Asian population breeds in E. Russia and NW China.  Small numbers wintering in Aleutian and Pribilof islands.

E. Russia and NW China; Aleutian and Pribilof islands

Emperor Geese

Yes

Yes

Year round

Portion of breeding range in Chukotka and some AK breeders molt in Chukotka.  From there birds migrate to staging and wintering areas in the W. AK and Aleutian Islands. Small segment of population stage and winter in Commander Islands and Kamchatka.

Chukotka and W. Alaska

Black Brant

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Portion of breeding range in Chukotka, some AK breeders molt on Wrangel Island (Russia), and Siberian breeders molt on Alaskan North Slope (Teshekpuk). Most of population migrates to staging areas in W.AK and winters along Pacific coast to Mexico. Birds breeding west of Kolyma (Russia) winter in Korea, China, and Japan (mixing in fall and to some degree in spring).

Chukotka, and N. and W. Alaska, W. coast of N.A.

Aleutian Canada Geese

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Portion of population breeds on Commander Island (Russia), then migrate through Alaska into Oregon and California.

Commander Island

Snow Geese

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Portion of population breeds on Wrangel Island (Russia), then migrates through Alaska into Pacific Flyway states (mixing with other waterbird species).

Wrangel Island

Eurasian Wigeon

Yes

No

 

Regular vagrant along west coast of North America, especially Aleutian Islands.

W. coast of North America, especially Aleutian Is.

Northern Pintail

Yes

Yes

May-Sep

Some Siberian breeders winter in W. US (California).  Also birds banded in North America have been recovered over large areas of E. Siberia and Kamchatka.

Siberia

Baikal Teal

Yes

No

 

Occasional vagrant to North America chiefly in Aleutians & extreme Western Alaska.

Aleutians & extreme Western Alaska

Common Pochard

Yes

No

 

Vagrant in W. Alaska (Aleutian and Pribilof Islands).

W. Alaska (Aleutian and Pribilof Islands)

Steller’s Eiders

Yes

Yes

Nov-Sep

Most of the population breeds E. Siberian arctic, these birds molt on Alaska Peninsula (Izembek and Nelson Lagoons).  Birds winter in largest numbers in Commander and Kuril Islands (Russia) and in smaller numbers in Northern Japan, along Alaska Peninsula, and Aleutian Islands.

Alaska Peninsula, and Aleutian Islands; E. Siberian arctic, Commander and Kuril Islands (Russia), Northern Japan

 

 

Asian Contact

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Species

Point of Contact

Common Eiders

Yes

Yes

Year round

Portion of AK and Canada breeders molting and wintering in Chukotka.  Portion of E. Siberian breeding population winters in Bering Sea (Aleutian Islands) mixing with AK and Canada breeders.

Chukotka and Aleutian Is.

King Eiders

Yes

Yes

Year round

Portion of AK and Canada breeding population molt and winter in Kamchatka and Kuril islands (Russia).  Portion of E. Siberian breeding population winters in Bering Sea (Aleutian Islands) mixing with AK and Canada breeders.

Kamchatka and Kuril islands (Russia) and E. Siberian arctic

Spectacled Eiders

No

Yes

Nov-Apr

E. Siberian arctic and Alaska breeders mix during winter in Bering Sea.

Bering Sea

Long-tailed Ducks

Yes

Yes

Oct-Apr

Yukon Kuskokwim Delta breeders and North Slope molters molt and winter along Chukotka, Kamchatka, south along the Russian coast, and Kuril and Sakhalin islands.

Chukotka and Kamchatka

Tufted Duck

Yes

No

 

Regular vagrant along west coast of North America.

W. coast of North America

 

Other Possibilities

Species

Specifics

Greater White-fronted Geese

Circumpolar distribution.

Green-winged Teal

Breed throughout middle latitude Northern Hemisphere.

Mallard

Holarctic distribution.

Northern Shoveler

Holarctic distribution.

Gadwall

Breed on Alaskan peninsula, Kamchatka, China, Russia.

Greater Scaup

Holarctic distribution.  AK breeders winter on Atlantic coast

Harlequin Ducks

Pacific population breeds from E. Siberia through Alaska to W. Canada.

Black Scoters

Pacific population breeds in Siberia and Kamchatka, into western Alaska and sparsely across Canada.

Common Goldeneye

Circumpolar distribution.

Red-breasted Merganser

Holarctic distribution.

1 For the most part, all the waterfowl species mix with other waterbirds along migration routes and at staging and wintering areas.

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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 1:15am
kathylynndean, fantastic table of yours. Thanks for sharing it. I notice the tufted duck has no asian contact for US. It does in Europe. It is one I have been monitoring. It was first species found to have H5N1 in France. I live in UK so hence my interest. HD

PS you got greast response in this thread. I guess we all love birds even if we think our lives are important as well.
    
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote kathylynndean Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 1:17am
This table covers SHOREBIRDS:
 

Table 4-3.  Shorebird species as potential carriers of the Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza subtype to North America.

 

Asian Contact

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Specifics

Point of Contact

Pacific Golden-Plover

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Pop. nesting in Siberia/Chukotka returns to North America; during passage through AK mixes with local nesting Pacific Golden-Plovers that winter in Hawaii and central Oceania.  Breeding birds from Siberia thought to also migrate overland to Southeast Asia and Oceania.  Birds wintering in the Marshall and Mariana Islands migrate through Southeast Asia whereas birds wintering in the Hawaiian Islands thought to migrate through Alaska.

Russian Far East and w. Alaska; Oceania, main Hawaiian Islands, Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, Marshall Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas

Black- bellied Plover

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Pop. nesting in Siberia/Chukotka returns to North America, mixing with birds in w. Alaska before both migrate to nonbreeding areas in North and Central America.

Russian Far East and w. Alaska

Semipalmated Plover

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

North American breeding and North and South American nonbreeding species with small breeding pop. recently established in Chukotka.    Chukotka pop. mixes with other species from the East Asian flyway (EAF) before returning to the Americas.

Chukotka, w. Alaska

Bar-tailed Godwit

Yes

Yes

Apr-Nov

About 90,000 birds migrate along the coast of E. Asia en-route to breeding grounds in n. and w. Alaska.  Coastal w. Alaska principal autumn staging area where birds mix with 15-20 spp. of shorebirds and equal number of waterfowl spp. that migrate to the Americas.

Birds spending nonbreeding season in Australia with potential to also mix with other pop. of godwits (L. l. menzberi)  that are restricted to coastal E. Asia

Marbled Godwit

No

Yes

Aug-Oct

Mixes with Bar-tailed Godwits at staging sites on AK Pen.  Migrates to Pacific NW.

AK Peninsula

Whimbrel

No

Yes

Jul-Aug

Contact occurs with Bar-tailed Godwits and plovers (Black-bellied and Pacific Golden) in w. AK & on AK Pen. Estuaries.

AK Peninsula

Bristle-thighed Curlew

Yes

Yes

May-Sep

Possible direct contact on nonbreeding grounds in Oceania; indirect through contact with Bar-tailed Godwits on w. AK breeding and YKD staging grounds

Seward

Pen., Andreafsky Wilderness, Yukon Delta NW Hawaiian Is. and the Marshall Is.

Greater Yellowlegs

No

Yes

Aug-Sep

Mixes with Bar-tailed Godwits at staging sites on YKD & AK Pen.

W Alaska

Wandering Tattler

Yes

Likely

May-Sep

Birds breeding in AK migrate to Hawaii and likely elsewhere in Oceania.  Bird in Australia during nonbreeding season may be from Alaska and/or part of breeding range in Chukotka.

Chukotka, W. Alaska

Ruddy Turnstone

Possibly

Likely

May-Sep

Not known if birds nesting on Chukotka come to AK postbreeding.  However, birds nesting in AK known to migrate to sites in EAF & Oceania. Birds from Eastern Siberia and Western Alaska also migrate along the East Asian coast, and a portion winter in the Mariana and Marshall Islands.

W. Alaska; Oceania, NW Hawaiian Islands, Marshall Island, Guam and Mariana Islands

 

Asian Contact

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Specifics

Point of Contact

Black Turnstone

No

Yes

Jul-Sep

On YKD mingles with species (Bar-tailed Godwit, Sharp-tailed Sandpiper, and C. a. arcticola Dunlin) that pass along EAF during migration.

W Alaska

Long-billed Dowitcher

Yes

Yes

Jun-Oct

Birds nesting in Chukotka/Siberia return to AK and then migrate to nonbreeding areas in temp. NA.  When in Russia there exists potential to have contact with numerous species that migrate along the EAF.

Siberia, W. Alaska

Surfbird

No

Yes

Jul-Sep

At AK Peninsula estuaries mixes with flocks of Bar-tailed Godwits that migrate along the EAF.

SW Alaska

Red Knot

Yes

Yes

May-Oct

Subspecies C. c. roselaari breeds in w. and n. Alaska and on Wrangel l.  and spends nonbreeding season along Pacific coast of N. & C. America.  Birds staging on YKD in spring possibly mix with C. c. rogersi pop. that reaches Alaska via Australia & EAF.   If no mixing with C. c. rogersi, then birds on Wrangel I. are in direct contact with other spp. of waders and waterfowl from EAF.

 

Wrangle Is.

W Alaska

Sanderling

?

Likely

Sep-Oct

Birds in autumn in W. Alaska likely from Asian nesting areas where direct contact likely.  Nonbreeding areas of birds in w. AK in autumn unknown.

W Alaska

Semipalmated Sandpiper

No

Yes

Jun-Aug

Widespread nesting species in n. Alaska where in direct contact with Dunlin (C. a. arcticola) that migrate through and winter in EAF.

N. and W. Alaska

Western Sandpiper

Possibly

Yes

Jun-Sep

Breeds in Chukotka with birds returning to nonbreeding areas in NA; also has contact with C. a. arcticola Dunlin in N. AK.

N. and W. Alaska

Red-necked Stint

Yes

Yes

Jun-Sep

Old World species that occasionally nest in w. Alaska with Western Sandpipers.

N. and W. Alaska

Pectoral Sandpiper

Yes

Yes

Jun-Aug

Birds nesting in Siberia/Russian Far East return to nonbreeding areas in SA via passage through N. America.  In Siberia the species is in direct contact with numerous spp. of waders and waterfowl from the EAF.

W. & N Alaska

Sharp-tailed Sandpiper

Yes

Yes

Aug-Oct

Possibly the entire annual cohort of juveniles comes to w. AK from Siberian nesting grounds where they have had contact with several pop. of birds that have migrated along the EAF.

Mostly W. Alaska

Buff-breasted Sandpiper

Yes

Yes

Jun-Aug

Breeds in Canada, AK but pop. also nests on Wrangel Is. and migrates through AK & N.A. to reach nonbreeding areas in S.A.

 

Wrangle Is.

W Alaska

 

Asian Contact

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Specifics

Point of Contact

Rock Sandpiper

Yes

Yes

Jun-Oct

C. p. tschuktschorum subspecies has portion of breeding range in Chukotka.  Birds from there migrate to nonbreeding areas in the Pacific NW via w. AK staging sites where they mix with Dunlin (C. a. pacifica) & Rock Sandpipers (C. p. ptilocnemis). 

W. & SW Alaska

Dunlin

Yes

Yes

May-Oct

C. a. arcticola nests in n. AK and migrates to nonbreeding areas in central EAF (Japan, Korea, Taiwan).  While in AK it has contact with numerous spp. of waders and waterfowl that migrate to N, C. & S. America.

N. & W. Alaska

Buff-breasted Sandpiper

Yes

Yes

Jun-Aug

Breeds in Canada, AK but pop. also nests on Wrangel Is. and migrates through AK & N.A. to reach nonbreeding areas in S.A.

Wrangle Is.

W Alaska

To further focus sampling, five criteria were employed to rank these migratory waterbirds and other migrants that are potential carriers of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus (see Tables 4-4 to 4-6 below).  These ranking criteria include 1) proportion of the population occurring in Asia, 2) contact with a known area of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus, 3) habitats used in Asia, 4) population size in Alaska, and 5) likelihood of obtaining a representative sample of sufficient size.  Table 4-7 is a summary of primary and secondary species that should be considered as sampling targets for highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus in the four major flyways (see also Attachment 5).

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This Table covers Waterfowl and Cranes:
 

Table 4-4. Ranking matrix for populations of waterfowl and cranes to be sampled for HPAI during the 2006 field season in Alaska.

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained?

Score

Steller's Eider

4

1

4

3

3

15

 

Most (>90%) of the Pacific-wintering population (250,000) breeds in northeastern Asia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Uses estuarine and freshwater habitats

Winter pop approx 80,000  Breeding population <1,000

Relatively easy to trap during fall molting period

 

Northern Pintail

2

2

4

4

3

15

 

Unknown number of Siberian-breeding birds migrate through Alaska to winter in North America

Asian summer range overlaps with known AI-infected areas

Freshwater marshes, ephemeral wetlands

Summer population approximately 1 million

Easy to capture in Alaska in autumn

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained?

Score

Lesser Snow Goose

5

1

4

3

2

14

 

The Wrangel Island colony of 110,000 breeding birds is managed as a discreet population

No known use of AI-infected areas

Freshwater marshes, ephemeral wetlands

Entire breeding population of 110,000 breeding birds plus young of the year migrate through Alaska en-route to the west coast states

Could be difficult to obtain target number depending on timing and route of migration.

 

Emperor Goose

2

1

4

3

3

13

 

Approximately 20,000 birds molt in Chukotka, several thousand breed in the Anadyr lowlands

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds moist tundra meadows and near wetlands

approximately 90% of the population winters in Alaska and approximately 60% summers in Alaska

Relatively easy to trap during summer and fall molting period

 

Black Brant

 

1

1

4

3

3

12

 

Several thousand birds nest in the Anadyr lowlands and on Wrangel Island

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds in moist sedge coastal tundra areas

Near entire Pacific population of 130,000 birds stage at Izembek Lag prior to fall migration to winter from B.C. to Mexico

Samples could be obtained easily from fall birds

 

Spectacled Eider

4

1

4

2

1

12

 

Over 90% of the world population (approx 300,000) nests in Arctic Russia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds moist tundra meadows and near wetlands

Approximately 9,000 birds breed on the Arctic Slope, and 8,000 on the Yukon- Kuskokwim Delta

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Aleutian Cackling Goose

1

1

4

3

2

11

 

Small numbers breed on Commander Islands and winter in Asia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds on Aleutian Islands in wet, grassy freshwater meadows

Approximately 70,000 birds in fall population

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Long-tailed Duck

2

1

2

3

3

11

 

Approx 250,000 breed in northeastern Russia, unknown numbers cross to North America

No known use of AI-infected areas

Nests coastal tundra; postbreeding use estuarine areas

Approx 80,000 summer in western Alaska, 600,000 in northern Alaska and western Canada

Samples could be obtained easily from fall birds

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained?

Score

Tundra Swan

1

1

4

3

2

11

 

Unknown numbers breed in eastern Chukotka; may be associated with Pacific Flyway

No known use of AI-infected areas

Nests coastal tundra; migration and non-breeding in coastal habitats

Approximately 150,000 summer in Alaska

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Common Eider

2

1

2

3

2

10

 

Approx 30,000 breed in northeastern Russia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds in wet or moist tundra meadows near wetlands or on barrier islands

Alaska population believed to be 25,000 western Alaska plus 120,000 in northern Alaska plus western Canada

Could be difficult to obtain target number in most locations

 

King Eider

 

2

1

2

3

2

10

 

Approx 150,000 breed in northeastern Russia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds in moist and upland tundra

Approx 360,000 breed in northern Alaska and western Canada

Could be difficult to obtain target number in most locations

 

Lesser Sandhill Crane

2

1

3.5

3

2

11.5

 

unknown numbers of mid-continent population breed in Siberia

No known use of AI-infected areas

Breeds in wet or moist tundra meadows near wetlands or on barrier islands, often feeds in agricultural areas where available

Alaska population believed to be in the low tens of thousands

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Ranking criteria:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.  Proportion of the population occurring in Asia.  Score as 1-5 where 5=100%

2.  Contact with a known 'hotspot' or source.  Score as 1=no contact, 2=contact

3.  Habitats used in context of likelihood of exposure 1=Offshore marine, 2=Estuary, 3=Terrestrial, 4=Freshwater.

4.  Population size in Alaska during 2006.  Score to the closest number 1=1,000, 2=10,000, 3=100,000, 4=1,000,000

5.  Can we obtain a representative sample of sufficient size (n=200)?  Score 1=no, 2=maybe, 3=yes.

 

 

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I have not noticed a publication source for this table. I like to keep sources available for further checking. Is it possible to post that, or have I just overlooked it??
 
Thank you for your time.
 
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This Table covers the RANKING MATRIX for SHOREBIRDS to be tested/sampled:
 

Table 4-5. Ranking matrix for populations of shorebirds to be sampled for avian influenza during the 2006 field season in Alaska.

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained

Score

Dunlin

(C. a. arcticola)

5

2

3

4

3

17

 

Entire pop. winters from Taiwan north to Yellow Sea and n. Japan

Winters throughout areas where H5N1 identified

Estuarine and freshwater habitats; also ephemeral inland lakes where domestic waterfowl raised

Est. at 650,000

Relatively. easy to trap on nest and during post-breeding when in flocks

 

Sharp-tailed Sandpiper

 

5

1

3.5

2

3

14.5

 

Breeding restricted to n. central Siberia with annual cohort of immatures coming to Alaska; adults move through EAA flyway

 

 

Migrating adults pass through known "hot spots" in central E. Asia.  Species of concern if adults can pass virus to offspring on breeding grounds

Freshwater marshes, brackish wetlands, salt ponds, sewage farms, ephemeral wetlands

Between 10,000 and 40,000 depending on annual production

Easy to capture in Alaska in autumn

 

Bar-tailed Godwit

(L. l. baueri)

5

2

2

3

2

14

 

Entire pop. nests w. and n. Alaska & stages central E. Asia (Yellow Sea, Korea, Japan) in spring; southward migration direct across Pacific

On migration stops in central E. Asia (Yellow Sea, Japan, Korea)

Estuarine

Est. at 120,000, but 2005 census efforts accounted for <50,000

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Ruddy Turnstone

(A. i. interpres)

3

2

2.5

2.5

3

13

 

Portion of W. Alaska nesting pop. migrates to SE and E Asia; pop. nesting Chukotka moves to W. Alaska in fall before returning to E and SE Asia. Eastern Siberia and West Alaska breeding birds also migrate down the East Asian coast, with some birds wintering in the Mariana and Marshall Islands

On migration stops in central E. Asia (Yellow Sea, Japan, Korea)

Breeds upland tundra; migration and non-breeding coastal (rocky intertidal, sand beaches, & mudflats)

>35% of North American pop. (= ~20,000 birds) in Alaska, plus historically large numbers visit (>20,000 on Pribilof Is.) from Chukotka

Unless post-breeding concentrations found (e.g., Pribilof Is.) could be difficult to meet target sample. 200 turnstones can be captured in either the Marshall or Mariana Islands or both

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained?

Score

Pectoral Sandpiper

 

3

1

4

3

2

13

 

Greater than 50% of pop. nests in Russia west to Eastern Taimyr Peninsular.

To date no known use of "hot spots"

Breeds marshy/grassy tundra; post-breeding uses brackish ponds freshwater marshes

200,000-300,000

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Red Knot

(C. c. rogersi & roselaari)

4

2

2

2.5

2

12.5

 

C.c. roselaari pop. nests Wrangel I. and w. Alaska and winters Pacific coast of the Americas.  C. c. rogersi nests Chukotka/New Siberian Isl. & winters Aust./New Zealand, passing through c. E. Asia

On migration C. c. rogersi passes through areas where H5N1 identified

Estuarine

C. c. roselaari <50,000; C. c. rogersi 220,000.  C. c. rogersi thought to stop in Alaska in spring but numbers unknown (possibly several 10,000s)

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Long-billed Dowitcher

 

3

1

3

3

2

12

 

>30% of pop. breeds in Russia where range expanding w. to Taimyr Pen.; >95% of entire pop. winters in North and Central America. Unknown numbers winter in Asia (Japan)

To date no known use of "hot spots"

Breeds coastal lowlands in wet, grassy freshwater meadows; uses estuarine and managed wetlands during migration & winter

 

North American pop. = 450,000 (>90% of this in Alaska during migration)

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Rock Sandpiper (C. p. tschuktschorum)

3

1

2.5

2

3

11.5

 

 

 

~ 20-30% of pop. nests in Chukotka

To date no known use of "hot spots"

Nests upland tundra; post-breeding use estuarine areas

Total pop. 50,000.  ~20K nest Chukotka but all return to AK en route to non-breeding areas in Pacific NW

 

 

 

Easy to trap on nest and during post-breeding flocking

 

Taxon

Total or partial contact with Asia

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Pop. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained?

Score

Pacific Golden-Plover

 

3

2

2.5

2

2

11.5

 

Nesting occurs w. & sw Alaska and over large portion of n. Siberia and Chukotka.  Interchange known between Asia and Alaska but not quantified.  Alaska-nesting birds disperse to Oceania and Pacific coast of N & C America. Birds wintering in the Marshall or Mariana Islands are believed to be birds that have migrated overland from Siberia to Southeast Asia and Oceania.

Likely in c. East Asia

Nests upland tundra; migration and nonbreeding in coastal habitats

16,000

Could be difficult to obtain target number in Alaska; however, 200 plovers can be captured in either the Marshall or Mariana Islands or both

 

 

 

 

 

Buff-breasted Sandpiper

2

1

3

2

2

10

 

Small portion of pop. nests Wrangel I. & Chukotka then returns to non-breeding area in southern S. America

To date no known use of "hot spots"

Variable but generally dry upland tundra

3,000, including ~1000 birds from Chukotka/Wrangel I. stopping on southward migration

Could be difficult to obtain target number

 

Ranking criteria:

1.  Proportion of the population occurring in Asia.  Score as 1-5 where 5=100%

2.  Contact with a known 'hotspot' or source.  Score as 1=no contact, 2=contact

3.  Habitats used in context of likelihood of exposure 1=Offshore marine, 2=Estuary, 3=Terrestrial, 4=Freshwater.

4.  Population size in Alaska during 2006.  Score to the closest number 1=1,000, 2=10,000, 3=100,000, 4=1,000,000

5.  Can we obtain a representative sample of sufficient size (n=200)?  Score 1=no, 2=maybe, 3=yes.

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This Table covers RANKING MATRIX for PASSERINES and LARID for HPAI sampling/testing:
 

Table 4-6. Ranking matrix for populations of passerines and a larid to be sampled for HPAI during the 2006 field season in Alaska.

 

Taxon

Proportion of population in Alaska

Contact with known "hot spot"

Habitat used in Asia

Population. in Alaska

Can samples be obtained

Score

Arctic Warbler (Phylloscopus borealis kennicotti)

5

2

3

4

3

17

 

Endemic subspecies to Alaska

Winters in Myanmar, Thailand, se. China, Taiwan, Philippines south to Andaman Is., Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia east to Moluccas

Terrestrial.  Wooded habitats, cultivated areas, grasslands, gardens, and mangroves

Est. at 2,700,000

Many locations where the most abundant breeding bird.  Easy to capture during breed and migration

 

Eastern Yellow Wagtail (Motacilla tschutschensis)

5

2

3.5

4

3

17.5

 

Endemic species to Alaska

Taiwan, Indonesia, Sunda Isles, and Moluccas

Terrestrial.  Open areas with water, sugarcane fields, rice fields, sparse grasslands, cassava plots; usually in association with wild and domestic grazing mammals

Est. 1,400,000

Easy to capture and areas with known concentration of breeding birds already identified

 

Gray-cheeked Thrush (Catharus minimus)

3

2

3

4

3

15

 

48% of global population in Alaska

Breeds in E. Siberia

Terrestrial.  Shrubs often in riparian habitats

Est. 5,000,000

Most abundant bird in many locations.  Already captured at many banding sites.

 

Glaucous Gull                        (Larus hyperboreus)

2

2

3

2

3

12

 

40,000 (100%) of US breeding population in AK

Contact with humans and garbage dumps

Terrestrial/coastal

Approx 40,000

Samples easily obtainable

 


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INTERESTING TABLE
This Table shows the INDIVIDUAL SPECIES designated for all four flyways.
 
Table 4-7.  Suggested migratory bird species for highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza surveillance in the four North American flyways.

 

Pacific Flyway

Taxon

Ranking

Tundra Swan (Western Population)

Primary

Lesser Snow Goose (Wrangel Island Population)

Primary

Northern Pintail

Primary

Long-billed Dowitcher

Primary

Red Knot (small numbers)

Primary

Pacific Golden Plover (small numbers)

Primary

Ruddy Turnstone (very small numbers)

Primary

Black Brant (Pacific Population)

Secondary

Cackling Goose

Secondary

Pacific Greater White-fronted Goose

Secondary

Mallard

Secondary

American Wigeon

Secondary

American Green-winged Teal

Secondary

Northern Shoveler

Secondary

 

Central Flyway

Taxon

Ranking

Lesser Sandhill Crane (Mid-continent)

Primary

Tundra Swan (Eastern Population)

Primary

Northern Pintail (low percentage from Alaska)

Primary

Pectoral Sandpiper

Primary

Buff-breasted Sandpiper

Primary

Long-billed Dowitcher

Primary

Greater White-fronted Goose (Mid-continent)

Secondary

Lesser Snow Goose (Western Central Flyway)

Secondary

Mallard

Secondary

American Wigeon

Secondary

American Green-winged Teal

Secondary

Northern Shoveler

Secondary


 

Mississippi Flyway

Taxon

Ranking

Pectoral Sandpiper

Primary

Dunlin

Primary

Long-billed Dowitcher

Primary

Greater White-fronted Goose

Secondary

Northern Pintail

Secondary

Mallard

Secondary

American Wigeon

Secondary

American Green-winged Teal

Secondary

Northern Shoveler

Secondary

Lesser Scaup

Secondary

Greater Yellow-legs

Secondary

Lesser Yellow-legs

Secondary

Ruddy Turnstone

Secondary

Gray-cheeked Thrush

Secondary

 

 

Atlantic Flyway

Taxon

Ranking

Tundra Swan (Eastern Population)

Primary

Greater Scaup

Primary

Horned Grebe (possibly Europe/Greenland breeders)

Primary

Lesser Scaup

Secondary

Canvasback

Secondary

Long-tailed Duck (unknown east-west interchange)

Secondary

Western Sandpiper

Secondary

Least Sandpiper (do not breed in Asia)

Secondary

Greater Yellow-legs (do not breed in Asia)

Secondary

Black-bellied Plover

Secondary

 

Sample Size

 

When sampling for highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus it is critical that an appropriate sample size for each species or species group in each designated sample population is obtained.  Equation 1 provides a method for calculating the recommended sample size:   

 

                                    n = log (1-c) / log(1-p)             (eq. 1) 

 

where n is the sample size, c is the desired level of confidence, and p is the prevalence of positive samples in the population. An adequate sample size should allow for >95% confidence that AI is detected at < 1.5% prevalence.  These criteria result in an estimated sample size of 200:

 

                                    n = log (1-.95) / log (1-0.015) = 200                           

 

Thus, a minimum of 200 samples should be collected from the population of interest based on an assumed prevalence of 1.5% of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza.  We caution that this calculation is very sensitive to the assumed prevalence, which we can not know a priori.  For example, if prevalence of the disease at the time of sampling is 0.1% (i.e., 1 in 1000 birds is infected) the necessary sample size is 3000.  As prevalence decreases the likelihood of detecting the disease in an individual bird also decreases due to the low probability of detection and practical limitations on laboratory processing capability.  We also caution that this formula is weakened here because it is based on assumptions that may not apply to H5N1 virus in wild birds, namely that the agent is homogeneously distributed within a host population that also is homogeneously distributed.

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FROM THE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT RELEASED ON 14 MARCH 2006.
Just some excerpts that I found interesting in no particular order:
 

Avian Influenza viruses (AI) are released by waterfowl through the intestinal tract and viable virus can be detected in both feces and the water in which the birds swim, defecate and feed.  This is the principle means of virus spread to new avian hosts and potentially to poultry and other susceptible livestock.  Analysis of both water and fecal material from waterfowl habitat can provide evidence of AI virus circulating in wild bird populations, the specific AI subtypes, levels of pathogenicity, and possible risks to livestock.


(Bothers me:)

Accredited laboratories have the capacity and infrastructure to analyze a limited number of samples for AI.  The anticipated sampling effort for this surveillance study will require an investment in equipment and staff to provide results in a timely fashion.  Equipment needs include real-time PCR thermalcyclers, RNA extraction capabilities, DNA sequencing capabilities, tissue culture and egg culture facilities, ultracold freezers, centrifuges and vacuum pumps.


Avian influenza (AI) is a type A influenza virus that is naturally found in certain species of waterfowl and shorebirds.  However, the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has raised concern regarding the potential impact on wild birds, domestic poultry, and human health should it be introduced into the United States (U.S.).  Numerous potential routes for introduction of the virus into the U.S. exist including illegal movement of domestic or wild birds, contaminated products, via an infected traveler, as a bioterrorism event, and the migration of infected wild birds.  This plan focuses primarily on the detection of a potential introduction of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus by migratory birds.


Avian influenza viruses are classified on the basis of two proteins, hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N), found on the surface of the virus.  Specific viral subtypes have one of 16 different H proteins and one of 9 different N proteins, resulting in 144 possible combinations or subtypes based on this classification scheme.  Within each subtype, there are numerous combinations of genetic sequences that determine the pathogenicity of the subtype to an infected host. 


(This answers a lot of questions:)

Wild birds, in particular certain species of waterfowl and shorebirds, are considered to be the natural reservoirs for all 144 subtypes.  These subtypes are adapted to survive in these wild species and usually cause little or no disease.  However, gradual genetic drift (i.e., mutation) can occur and a particular subtype can become adapted to infect other species of wild birds and domestic birds.  Although this slight genetic change in the virus allows it to infect new species, it usually does not cause disease in the new host.  The virus can also change if a host is simultaneously infected with another type A influenza virus.  In such situations, mixing of the genetic material from the two virus strains (genetic shift) can occur, resulting in the formation of a new strain.  The combination of gradual drifts and rapid shifts results in the production of a strain that now causes morbidity and mortality in susceptible hosts.  If the morbidity and mortality is significant, the virus is classified as a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus.


(Important dates:)

During 1995-96, it is thought that antigenic drift occurred in an AI virus of wild birds, allowing the virus to infect chickens in China.  This was followed by reassortment into the HPAI virus subtype highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza.  Since that time, this highly pathogenic H5N1 has been circulating in Asian poultry and domestic fowl resulting in significant mortality to these species.  Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza likely underwent further antigenic drift and shift allowing infection in additional species of birds, mammals, and humans.  More recently, this virus moved back into wild birds resulting in significant mortality of species such as bar-headed geese, brown-headed gulls, black-headed gulls, ruddy shelducks, and great cormorants in China during April 2005. 


(This is also bothersome)

On 10 August 2005, the Working Group met by teleconference to initiate development of a “Plan For the Detection of HPAI Virus in Migratory Birds in the United States”.  After some discussion among the participants it was decided that while the immediate concern was the introduction of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus via migratory birds into Alaska and the Pacific Flyway (including Hawaii and other Pacific Islands), the group would also begin to address detection of the virus in all the North American flyways. 


(The Plan:)

If highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus spreads to North America via migratory birds, the above analysis of the major flyways suggests that the virus would most likely arrive first in Alaska.  Such a scenario is reasonable, as the contribution of Eurasian AI viruses to the genetic composition of viruses in North American migratory birds has already been demonstrated.  Given the current knowledge on highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza distribution, the Working Group developed a prioritized sampling approach based on Alaska and the major North American flyways. 

  

This approach prioritized the following regions in decreasing order of importance:

 

1.  Alaska, the Pacific Flyway, and Oceania

2.  Central Flyway

3   Mississippi Flyway

4.  Atlantic Flyway


     (Collection:)

If   If birds are found morbid or dead, it is important to use proper personal protection techniques (http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/research/WHB/WHB_05_03.html, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/professional/protect-guid.htm) and to submit the entire carcass to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory for necropsy (Attachment 8).  Field biologists should contact the specific laboratory that they will be working with well in advance of any specimen collection and shipping to receive specific instructions for specimen submissions to that laboratory.  Laboratories should always be notified ahead of time when a shipment is being made to their facility.

  
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This Table shows the LOON species as potential carriers.

 

Table 4-1. Loon species as potential carriers of the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza subtype to North America.

 

Asian Contact

 

 

 

Species

Direct

Indirect

Timing

Specifics1

Point of Contact

Yellow-billed Loon

Yes

Yes

Oct-Apr

Birds breeding on Alaskan north slope winter off of Japan, Korea, China.

Coastal Japan, Korea, China

Red-throated Loon

Yes

Yes

Oct-Apr

Birds breeding on Alaskan north slope winter off of Chukotka and Kamchatka.

Coastal Chukotka and Kamchatka

Pacific/Arctic Loon

 

 

 

Little data is available but probably follow similar patterns to yellow-billed and red-throated loons.

1. For the most part, loon species mix with other waterbirds along migration routes and at staging and wintering areas.
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How to PACK UP and SHIP those darn birds:

Purpose:

 

The purpose of this standard operating procedure is to ensure diagnostic specimens are shipped safely and in compliance with governing regulations and requirements.  Shippers of diagnostic specimens where a relatively low probability exists that infectious substances are present (diagnostic specimens being transported to undergo routine screening tests or for the purpose of initial diagnosis may be considered to fall under this category) must comply with the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations.  The shipper must also ensure that shipments are prepared in such a manner that they arrive at their destination in good condition and that they present no hazard to persons or animals during shipment.

Procedures:

 

Federal Express is the preferred carrier for the USDA/NWRC.  Use next day service.
 
 The inner packaging (appropriately labeled) must be comprised of a watertight primary receptacle, and must no exceed 500 ml total  volume.        Primary  receptacles include those of glass, metal, or plastic (i.e., test tube, plastic jar, or taped zip-loc bag).  Positive means of ensuring a leak-proof seal must be provided.  Screw caps on primary receptacles must be reinforced with adhesive tape.

 

 A secondary packaging (also water tight) must be used, but must not exceed 4 L total volume.
 

An absorbent material sufficient to absorb the entire contents of all primary receptacles must be placed between the primary receptacle and the secondary  packaging. 

 

The outer packaging (i.e., cardboard box or cooler) must be of adequate strength for its capacity, weight, and intended use (capable to withstand being dropped at least 1.2 meters, without leakage of the primary receptacle or significant damage to the outer packaging).
 
An itemized list of contents must be enclosed between the secondary packaging and the outer packaging.  To protect against possible leakage, the list should be enclosed in a sealed plastic bag.
 
A Shippers Declaration for Dangerous Goods is not required.  However, both the air waybill and the outer box must show the text "DIAGNOSTIC SPECIMEN PACKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH IATA PACKING INSTRUCTION 650".
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Hi James USA,
 
Yes, I have listed the source, but I have no idea which posting it is in.   It is the official US response to H5N1 and it was released on 14 March 2006.   It can be downloaded in either MS Word or PDF format.   I downloaded the Word version, and it is 91 pages long and 1.37MB in size.   BTW, there is not one mention of crows in the entire document.
 
Go to:  http://www.usda.gov/   and just look for the following:

An Early Detection System for Highly Pathogenic H5N1

Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds

U.S. Interagency Strategic Plan

 

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Thanks for highlighting that source info Kathy Lynn!!
 
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This is my last posting, Part One.   I was asked to list all State reps and labs, and here they are:
I could not put all info on one page.   NOTE:  listed the "primary" States in RED.
 
Veterinary Laboratories Currently Certified to Conduct Highly pathogenic
H5N1 avian influenza Virus Diagnostics
 
State
Lab
Director
Lab
Name
Phone
Shipping
Address 1
Shipping
Address 2
City
Zip
Code
Lab Director E-Mail
AI/END
Contact

AL

 

Charles S. Roberts Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

334-844-4987

1001 Wire Road

 

Auburn

36830

 

Dr. Fred Hoerr

AR

Dr.Pluml Konnie ee

Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Commission Lab

501-907-2400

One Natural Resources Dr.

 

Little Rock

72205

kpluml@arlpc.org

Dr. Paul Norris

AZ

Dr. Greg Bradley

Arizona Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

520-621-2356

2831 N. Freeway

 

Tucson

85705

gabrad@ag.arizona.edu

Dr. Greg Bradley

CA

Dr. Alex Ardans

California Animal Health & Food Safety Lab

530-752-8709

University of California, School of Vet Med

W. Health Science Drive

Davis

95616

aaardans@ucdavis.edu

Dr. Alex Ardans

CO

Dr. Barbra Powers

Colorado State University Veterinary Diag. Lab

970-297-1281

College of Vet. Med. & Biomedical Sciences

300 West Drake

Fort Collins

80523

bep@lamar.colostate.edu

Dr. Barbra Powers

CT

Dr. Herbert Van Kruiningen

Department of Pathobiology & Veterinary Science

860-486-0837

University of Connecticut, Unit 3089

61 N. Eagleville Rd.

Storrs

06269-3089

herbert.vandruiningen@uconn.edu

Dr. Sandra Bushmich

DE

 

University of Delaware Poultry Laboratory

302-856-1997

16684 County Seat Hi-Way

 

Georgetown

19947

 

Dr. Mariano Salem

FL

Dr. Betty Miguel

Kissimmee Diagnostic Laboratory

407-846-5200

Florida Department of Agriculture

2700 N. John Young Parkway

Kissimmee

34745

miguelb@doacs.state.fl.us

Dr. Betty Miguel

GA

 

Georgia Poultry Laboratory

770-535-5996

4457 Oakwood Road

 

Oakwood

30566

 

Dr. James Scroggs

GA

Dr. Doris Miller

Athens Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

706-542-5568

University of Georgia College of Vet Med

Building 1079

Athens

30602

miller@vet.uga

Dr. Doris Miller

GA

Dr. Charles A. Baldwin

University of Georgia Veterinary Diag. Laboratory

229-386-3340

43 Brighton Road

 

Tifton

31793-3000

cbaldwin@uga.edu

Dr. CDr. Charles A. Baldwinharles A.

HI

Dr. David T. Horio

State Laboratories Division

808-453-5990

2725 Waimano Home Road

 

Pearl City

96782

david.horio@doh.hawaii.gov

Dr. David T. Horio

IA

Dr. Bruce

Jankee

Iowa State University

515-294-1950

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

1600 S. 16th St.

Ames

50011

bhjanke@iastate.edu

Dr. Kyoung-Jin Yoon

IN

Dr. Leon Thacker

Purdue Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab

765-494-7460

406 South Lafayette

 

West Lafayette

47907

thackerl@purdue.edu

Dr. Leon Thacker

LA

Dr. H.W. Taylor

Louisiana State University

225-578-9777

Veterinary Med Diag. Laboratory

1909 Skip Bertman Drive

Baton Rouge

70803

hwt@vetmed.lsu.edu

Dr. Alma Roy

MD

Dr. Daniel Bautista

Maryland Dept. of Ag & Animal Health Laboratory

410-543-6610

27722 Nanticoke Road

 

Salsbury

21801

 

Dr. Daniel Bautista

MI

Dr. Willie Reed

Diagnostic Center of Population and Animal Health

517-353-0635

Michigan State University

4125 Beaumont Rd, Ste 201H

Lansing

48910

reed@dcpah.msu.edu

Dr. Willie Reed

MN

Dr. James E. Collins

Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

612-625-8787

University of Minnesota, Vet Diag Lab

1333 Gortner Ave, 244 Vet D L

St. Paul

55108

colli002@unm.edu

Dr. James E. Collins

MO

Dr. Alex Bermudez

University of Missouri

573-882-6811

Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

1600 East Rollins

Columbia

65211

bermudeza@missouri.edu

Dr. Stanley Casteel

MS

Dr. Lanny Pace

Mississippi Vet Research & Diagnostic Laboratory

601-354-6089

2531 North West Street

 

Jackson

39216

pace@cvm.msstate.edu

Dr. Lanny Pace

NC

Dr. Gene Erickson.

North Carolina Department of Agriculture

919-733-3986

Rollins Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab

2101 Blue Ridge Rd.

Raleigh

27607

gene.erickson@ncmail.net

Dr. Gene Erickson.

NE

Dr. David Steffen

Veterinary Diagnostic Center

402-472-1434

University of Nebraska

137 VDC UNL

Lincoln

68583-0907

dsteffen1@unl.edu

DDr. David Steffenr.

 
This list represents the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) labs certified as of  3/14/06 to conduct avian influenza screening.  This list will be updated as new labs become certified.  For the latest list of certified laboratories, please contact Thomas.J.Deliberto@aphis.usda.gov
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The thought of fed-exing a bird albeit a dead one is amusing.

'...Although this slight genetic change in the virus allows it to infect new species, it usually does not cause disease in the new host...' We've all been concerned on this one. I wonder sometimes why we are not attacking the flu at source. I.e. in birds. We've had scores of years to achieve this and we would not be in the predicament that are getting into now if we had acted.

Thanks again, these tables are very informative kathylyndean.
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Siameselade Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 9:33am
You know up here we have a lot of lakes, people swimming in them, as well as ducks. I wonder if that is dangerous now?
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Hi Siameselade,
 
I had to send a sample of my pond water to the lab.   It is one of the major ways that H5N1 is transmitted due to the Government document.
 
I just finished writing a loooong note and lost it!!!    If these crows test positive, do I drain my pond?   What about my approx 250 foot long and over gold fish?   Will they be contaminated?   Is every King Fisher and Great Blue Heron that eats those fish contaminated?
 
Dr. Jerry Heidel phoned me a while ago, and the test results will be in this afternoon.   They started testing the crows immediately yesterday morning.   I am a nervous wreck.   I don't want to lose my animals that I love so much, so I hope they test negative.
 
But I do believe that H5N1 is in Oregon, so if I have to sacrifice my animals, it will be the best for society.   It's just that I have lost so much I love this past year, including a husband of 23 years to divorce.   I have no family, I never had children, and all of my friends are in California.   And the area of Oregon that I live in is not known for compassion.   They would rather shoot birds than save birds, and my whole property is designed to be a wildlife habitat and protection area.   I'll probably be hauled off to jail if they test positive and be blamed for bringing H5N1 to the area!   Stupid people!
 
My ex-husband picked up what he thought was an abandoned chicken from a super market late at night.   I phoned the market the following day when I found out the chicken "hung-out" there.   They ended up giving us Speckles, and never pressed charges, but 6 days later a SWAT team jumped my fence at 1:30AM and grabbed the chicken AND my husband!   Seven cops and a total of 6 squad cars.   One car sat at the end of the road in case my ex "tried to escape with the chicken!"   They would not let him get dressed and took him to jail naked with no shoes (he is diabetic) with only his red briefs on.  They forced him to walk over 3/4 minus base rock for approx 150 feet.  Barefoot and diabetic.    It was an illegal arrest, and the DA ended up dropping all charges, but we went through one year of hell.
 
The cops immediately put the chicken back in the store parking lot, and a teenager kicked her to death two weeks later.   The media lied to the public, but I read the police report.   I was so sickened.   Plug "Nick Gombos, Speckles, Arrest" into Google; you won't believe what happened to us.
 
I really am nervous about these test results.   The minute I hear, I will post...Kathy
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Kathy,
I just read 3 of the articles that came up in Google.
The whole thing is horrible and ridiculous. I hope your crows test negative - you have been through too much already.
Thank you for sharing with us.
Deb (oknut)
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This is my last posting, Part Two.   I was asked to list all State reps and labs, and here they are:
I could not put all info on one page.  NOTE: I listed the "primary" States in RED.
 
Veterinary Laboratories Currently Certified to Conduct Highly pathogenic
H5N1 avian influenza Virus Diagnostics
 

NJ

Dr. Robert Eisner

New Jersey Dept of Ag, Division of Animal Health

609-984-2293

State Diagnostic Lab, H & A Building

Rm 201 John Fitch Plaza, P.O. Box 330

Trenton

08625

rjeisner1@comcast.net

Dr. Robert Eisner

NM

Dr. Flint Taylor

New Mexico Department of Agriculture

505-841-2576

Veterinary Diagnostic Services

700 Camino de Salud, NE

Albuquerque

87106

ftaylor@nmda.nmsu.edu

Dr. David Mills

NV

Dr. Anette Rink

Nevada Animal Disease Laboratory

775-668-1182

Nevada Department of Agriculture

350 Capitol Hill Ave.

Reno

89502-2923

arink@govmail.state.nv.us

Dr. Anette Rink

NY

Dr. Alfonso Torres

Animal Health Diagnostic Center

607-253-4136

Cornell University, College of Vet. Med.

S3 110 Schurman Hall, Upper Tower Rd.

Ithaca

14853

at97@cornell.edu

Dr. Sung Kim

OH

Dr. Beverly Byrum

Ohio Department of Agriculture

614-728-6220

Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

8995 E. Main Street, Building 6

Reynoldsburg

43068

byrum@mail.agri.state.oh.us

Dr. Beverly Byrum

OK

Dr. Bill J. Johnson

Oklahoma Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

405-744-6623

Oklahoma State Univ., College of Vet. Med.

Farm Road & Ridge Road

Stillwater

74078

billyjj@cvm.okstate.edu

Dr. W. C. Edwards

OR

Dr. Jerry Heidel

Oregon State Veterinary Diagnostic Lab

541-737-3261

Oregon State Univ., College of Vet. Med.

30th & Washington

Corvallis

97331

jerry.heidel@oregonstate.edu

 (This is the doctor I have been dealing with)

Dr. Jerry Heidel

PA

Dr. Helen Acland

Pennsylvania State Vet Diagnostic Laboratory

717-787-8808

2305 N. Cameron Street

 

Harrisburg

17110

hacland@state.pa.us

Dr. Deepanker Tewari

PA

 

Dr. Sherrill Davison

University of Pennsylvania

610-925-6210

Lab of Large Animal Pathology & Toxicology

New Bolton Center, 382 West Street Rd

Kennett Square

19348-1692

 

Dr. Sherrill Davison

SC

Dr. Pamela Parnell

Clemson Veterinary Diagnostic Center

803-788-2260

500 Clemson Road

 

Columbia

29229

pprnll@clemson.edu

Dr. Pamela Parnell

TX

Dr. Lelve Gayle

Texas Vet Medical Diagnostic Laboratory

979-845-9000

1 Sippel Road

Drawer 3040

College Station

77843

1-gayle@tvmdl.tamu.edu

Dr. Lelve Gayle

UT

Dr. Tom Baldwin

Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

435-797-1895

950 E. 1400 North

 

Logan

84322-5700

tjbald@cc.usu.edu

Dr. Tom Baldwin

VA

Dr. David W. Brown

Virginia Dept of Agriculture and Animal Health Lab

540-434-3897

116 Reservoir

 

Harrisonburg

22801

 

 

Dr. David W. Brown

WA

Dr. Terry McElwain

Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

509-335-9696

Bustad Hall

Room 155-N

Pullman

99164

tfm@vetmed.wsu.edu

Dr. Terry McElwain

WA

 

Dr. A. S. Dhillon

Avian Health and Food Safety Laboratory

253-445-4537

7613 Pioneer Way E.

 

Puyallup

98371-4919

 

Dr. A. S. Dhillon

WI

Dr. Leslie Dierauf

USGS National Wildlife Health Center

608-270-2400

6006 Schroeder Road

 

Madison

53711

ldierauf@usgs.gov

Dr. Leslie Dierauf

WI

Dr. Kathy Kurth and  Pete Vanderloo

Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

608-262-5432

Wisconsin Department of Agriculture

6101 Mineral Point Road

Madison

53705

Kathy.Kurth@WVDL.wisc.ed

Dr. Kathy Kurth and  Pete Vanderloo

WV

 

Dr. Jewell Plumley

West Virginia Dept of Agriculture

304-558-2214

1900 Boulevard, East

 

Charleston

25305-0172

 

Dr. Jewell Plumley

 

 a This list represents the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) labs certified as of  3/14/06 to conduct avian influenza screening.  This list will be updated as new labs become certified.  For the latest list of certified laboratories, please contact Thomas.J.Deliberto@aphis.usda.gov

 

 

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They tested NEGATIVE, but Dr. Heidel thanked me for being "a responsible citizen" and submitting them.   He had also thought there was a possibility they could test positive.
 
I asked him what they did die from, and he said he did not know.   They only tested for H5N1.   He said they probably died from poison.   We hear that word a lot, don't we?
 
They automatically do a WNV test, but he doubts they will test positive for that since it is so early in the year.   He will let me know.
 
He thinks the first case of H5N1 will show up in a backyard poultry flock, so we shall see.   It remains a mystery why birds keep dropping out of the sky and washing up on shore in Oregon.   Maybe it is just the Hunta Virus, Lassa fever, Rift Valley virus, Junin virus, Machuppo virus, Guanarito virus, or maybe a flesh eating bacteria......
 
Signed, A bit relieved that my property will not be surrounded by yellow tape and considered contaminated...Kathy
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Thank God!

I've been so worried.

BIG SIGH..................

Thanks for all of your hard work on this one!Clap

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Kathy wrote: If birds from the West Coast become infected, waterfowl hunters potentially would be among the first humans in North America to encounter those birds and be exposed to H5N1.
 
Here is what the California Department of Fish and Game is recommending to California Hunters
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/wmd/Avianflu_05.pdf
 
Are bird hunting dogs at risk of getting Avian Influenza?
A: Dogs used in wild bird hunting are not considered at risk of acquiring avian flu, since there have been no documented cases of the H5N1 virus infecting dogs. Dog owners should consult their veterinarian for more information about influenza in pets.
 
Suggested reading... As you can see we are finding virus's can and do jump species. 

There are documented cases of H5N1 infecting Dogs.

 
Avian influenza (H5N1) viruses isolated from humans in Asia in 2004 exhibit increased virulence in mammals.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=16140756&query_hl=17&itool=pubmed_docsum
 
The origins of new pandemic viruses: the acquisition of new host ranges by canine parvovirus and influenza A viruses.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=16153179&query_hl=30&itool=pubmed_docsum
 
Evolution In Action: Why Some Viruses Jump Species
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060316091731.htm
 
H5N1 in Dogs and Cats ~"The expanded geographical reach and host range of H5N1 is cause for concern.  The spread of H5N1 allows for more dual infections, recombinations, and new sequences causing new problems.  Moreover, these new sequences can increase the affinity for human receptors, such as S227N, and can be generated in avian hosts infected with H5N1 and H9N2 as predicted previously."
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/02140601/H5N1_Dogs_Cats.html
 
H5N1 Canine Deaths in Thailand "However, if it is passed from dog to dog, it is another cause for concern because the H5N1 circulating in Thailand generates a very high case fatality rate in humans and there is little difference between H5N1 isolated from birds and cats and H5N1 isolated from fatal human cases." 
http://www.recombinomics.com/news/10040401/canine_deaths.html
 
H5N1 Bird Flu Infection in Mink Expands Host Range ~ "E627K is found in all human H1, H2, H3 serotypes and is associated with the ability of the polymerase to efficiently function at lower temperatures (33 C) compared to E627 (41 C).  Prior to last year, E627K had not been found in any bird H5N1 isolates.  However, at Qinghai Lake, all 16 bird isolates has E627K and all Qinghai H5N1 strain isolates reported since last year have had E627K. The presence of E627K in all Qinghai isolates may increase the likelihood of mammalian infections from eating H5N1 infected birds.  Therefore, the number of mammalian species infected with H5N1 may be significantly higher than those reported above.  Transmission of H5N1 to other mammalian species increases the likelihood of recombination and acquisition of mammalian polymorphisms, which can lead to an expanded host range.
The fixing of E627K in H5N1 in long range migratory birds may have significant impact"
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/03280601/H5N1_Mink.html
 
H5N1 Bird Flu Detected in Live Cats in Austria
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/03060604/H5N1_Austria_Cats.html
 
Emailed a copy of this to dyparraguirre@dfg.ca.gov and news@kusi.com
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote araywood Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 12:22pm
Kathylynndean
 I am glad to hear the test came back negative. However keep your eyes open for any suspicious (HUMAN) type activity around the pond. I don't like being a Jerk. I think you would have gotten the same answer if it was infected. Let us hope it is negative truly. 
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Fiddlerdave Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 12:47pm
Looked up your references to your "incident" and the pages about your malevolent criminal activities!  Such a hoot!  Maybe the sheriff's TV cable was out, and his wife had exiled him to the couch for being a jerk, so he had nothing to do.  Does go to show no good deed goes unpunished!
 
However, I would point this out as a thought to consider for those who, in the event of a panemic, would want to  abandon all inmates to die of starvation. "Criminals" like you are all too common in our penal system, and "good honest men" like the sheriff are all too common in postions of power.  And a majority of people are willing and happy to give power to the people like that sheriff to listen to their phones, read their mail, enter their homes, and arrest them without Habeus Corpus (keep you in secret, forever, on their whim) whenever a guy like that feels like it!!??  The USA is in a sorry state.
 
Really enjoyed your web site!  Lovely work!  Thanks for all the references, and now I know what to expect when a dozen dead birds are lying by my feeder and I try to see what happened.  Thank you. 
Dave
"Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for us"!
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Fiddlerdave Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: March 30 2006 at 12:51pm
PS  When I said, "Such a Hoot!", I do want you to know that I am sure that was is hell for you and Nick.  I hope you end owning city hall in a damage suit. Maybe if the voters shell out 20 million they will think about how they want rational people in postions of authority. 
Dave
"Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for us"!
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Kathy,
 
As a former deputy sheriff I feel obligated to explain the real charge against your husband for chicken theft.  The real charge is MDM or PDO (standing for 'Made the Deputy Mad', or 'Pissed the Deputy Off')
 
These are very serious personal offenses because they offend the pubic's sense of decadence and good order.  The deputy in question is an authorized defender of the pubic order and had no choice but to prosecute your husband to the fullest in order to set an example for other would be chicken thieves and no count neer'- do - wells.
 
The MDM charge has been fulled supported in the courts by none other than Judge Roy R Bean who said, 'When it comes to chicken thieves, we always give'em a fair trial before we hang'em.'
 
You and your husband are very fortunate to have escaped  the wrath of the law.  In the future, please steal all your chickens from Sanders, Col. Retired.
 
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LOL!   Thanks for the "head's up" Snicklefritz.   Yes, it was quite an ordeal.   AP picked up the story, and it literally went around the world in one day.   My web site is so out of date it's ridiculous.   I have not touched it for 2 years, and it needs reformatting, things are not working on it, etc.   Both Leno and Letterman did jokes about the Josephine County Sheriff Department and Nick, plus the residents of Grants Pass wrote letters to the editor for months!   They are still upset about it.   People can never get the Sheriff to respond to anything, he is always complaining about lack of funds, and then he pulled a stunt like that.   They did NOTHING legal.   You can not even go after chickens later than 10:00PM!   If a warrant has to be served, it has to be before 10:00PM unless it is murder, or something like that.
 
They never presented a search warrant, they all jumped my fence to get in without announcing they were here to get Speckles, they broke my automatic iron gate to push Nick through when exiting (I could not see what was happening at the gate, but I could have opened it from inside the house) and they arrested Nick because he turned around to come in the house to get some clothes!!!   They said he was fleeing the scene!   I can laugh now, but it was traumatic beyond belief.   And, lots of newspapers referred to Nick as a "Chicken Thief!"   Can you imagine?   Plus the SPCA had told us to keep the chicken since they were investigating complaints about people tracking chicken s**t into the grocery store!
 
I received another call from Dr. Heidel, and he said the crows tested negative for WNV.
 
If anything came from this, I think we all had a crash course in crows and their relation to H5N1.   Plus, we all know a lot more about crows and Avian Flu than the average person.   In fact, we all know a lot more about that subject than most Vets, State and Federal Health workers.... 
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State preps for possible flu pandemicMarch 31, 2006

PORTLAND (AP) — Oregonians and people across the country need to take the possibility of a flu pandemic seriously and prepare for a possible outbreak, a top Bush administration official and Oregon’s governor said Thursday.

“We’re overdue for a pandemic and under-prepared,” Mike Leavitt, secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, told more than 100 government, health and business representatives at an influenza planning summit.

At the meeting, state and federal officials sharpened their plans to deal with a potential global influenza problem in Oregon. If a pandemic occurs, government officials are prepared to detect and attempt to control it but said the total impact would be beyond their reach.

An influenza pandemic could cripple the work force, economy and well-being of the state. So, officials recommend all citizens, community groups and businesses also make plans to cope.

“People of Oregon will have to come to the help of people of Oregon,” said Leavitt, whose agency is holding influenza pandemic preparedness summits in every state.

A flu pandemic occurs when a new virus emerges that can be passed easily and rapidly among people across the globe. Because it is new, people would have no natural immunity and it could cause a more serious problem than a normal seasonal flu.

If a moderate flu pandemic occurred, about 1 million Oregonians could become ill, 12,000 could require hospitalization and 3,000 could die, the state public health department said. There has not been an influenza pandemic since 1968 and the odds are low that the current avian flu strain will mutate to one passed easily among humans, said Susan Allan, Oregon’s public health director.

If an influenza pandemic did occur, hospital and health systems could be short of staff and equipment to care for all patients, forcing some to ration care. The public health system would be able to communicate in real-time with hospitals and other first responders but might not be able to address all community needs.

“We seem to live in increasingly troubled times,” Gov. Ted Kulongoski said.
“Strangely though, Americans are not worried about influenza.”

“We in Oregon are not prepared for a pandemic,” Kulongoski said.

Kulongoski and others urged families, community groups and businesses to use government tips and checklists, which are available online, to develop disaster plans.
Oregon officials said they are constantly updating their ability to respond to a major emergency. The state has disbursed more than $28 million of federal grants during the last four years to improve public health response. It has already held a small test of its response system and will conduct a full-scale test in the fall.

“Anything you say about a pandemic before it happens seems alarmist; anything you do after it comes that you’ve prepared for seems inadequate,” Leavitt said. “There’s no one in the world who is well-prepared for a pandemic ... we are getting better prepared everyday.”



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